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Mr. Geoffrey Butler
Clerk
Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

Busch Corporation vs. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company, et al., Case No. 19859

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the case of Weaver Brothers, Inc. v. Chappel,
684 P.2nd 123 (Alaska 1984), a copy of which is attached,
is hereby submitted as supplemental authority in support
of Point II of the plaintiff/appellantfs Brief, regarding
the effect of breach of notice provisions in relieving
an insurer of its obligations under the insurance polcy.
The reason for bringing this case to the attention
of the Court at this time is that it is a recently decided,
newly published opinion which is directly on point with
the issue, as stated above, which has not previously been
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court.
Very truly yours,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

Karen J
KJM:jw
Enclosure
cc: Darwin C. Hansen, Esq.
Roger H. Bullock, Esq,
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We affirm the remand to the CFEC to
allow Byayuk to present evidence on his
claim for income dependence points under
Temple ton. The portion of the order allowing Byayuk to submit evidence on his
failure to meet the additional evidence
deadline is vacated.
AFFIRMED as modified.26
(O
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WEAVER BROTHERS, INC., Appellant.
v.
Patricia CHAPPEL, Special Administrator of the Estate of Eberhardt
Hantsch, Appellee.
No. 7603.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
June 29, 1984.
Wrongful death action was filed, in
which claim for contribution was filed.
The special administrator moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court, Third
Judicial District, Milton M. Souter, J.,
granted motion, and appeal was taken.
The Supreme Court, Compton, J., held that:
(1) absent prejudice, delayed notice is no
reason for excusing an insurer from its
obligations; (2) insurer must prove prejudice from untimely notice; and (3) since
insurer failed to show want of genuine
issues of fact, summary judgment should
have been denied regardless of whether
opponent failed to respond.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Insurance <s=>146
Interpretation of insurance provisions
is not controlled directly by usual contrac26. The other issues raised by the parties are
only relevant if we decline to apply Templeton
retroactively to final determinations. Since we

tual principles, and insurance policies may
be considered contracts of adhesion due to
inequality in bargaining power.
2. Insurance <S=>539.8
Requirement of prompt notice of claim
or loss is to protect the insurer from prejudice and absent prejudice, regardless of
reasons for the delayed notice, there is no
justification for excusing the insurer from
its obligations.
3. Insurance <s=>539.8
In case of untimely notice to an insurer, the insurer must prove that it has actually been prejudiced by the delay before its
liability is extinguished; declining to follow
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 360
F.Supp. 139; Artukovich v. St.Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 312,
310 P.2d 461; Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 222 So.2d 206; Calhoun v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 260 Wis. 34,
49 N.W.2d 911.
4. Insurance <$=562.4(1)
Generally, proof of prejudice to an insurer from delayed notice is a fact question.
5. Judgment <S=181(2, 3)
Summary judgment may only be granted if the proponent shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
6. Judgment <3=>185.3(12)
Since insurer did not meet its initial
burden of showing that there were no genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment motion should have been denied regardless of whether opponent failed to respond to the motion with affidavits or other
evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e).
Mark A. Sandberg, Camerot, Sandberg &
Hunter, Anchorage, for appellant.
Nelson P. Cohen, Anchorage, for appellee.
do extend Templeton to that level, we need not
address the other issues.
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Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and
MOORE, JJ.
OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.
This case raises the issue of whether
untimely notice of an accident to an insurer
is per se sufficient to relieve the insurer
from any obligation to the insured. If not,
we must decide who has the burden of
demonstrating that the delay prejudiced
the insurer and whether the burden has
been met in this case.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND.
Eberhardt Hantsch, Mama Jill Hantsch
and Jonathan Hantsch were killed on September 4, 1974, when their Volkswagon
van, driven by Eberhardt, collided with a
tractor-trailer driven by Thomas Todd, an
employee of Weaver Brothers, Inc. (hereafter WBI). Eberhardt Hantsch was insured
by the Insurance Company of British Columbia (hereafter ICBC).
Sometime after the accident a settlement
of $85,000 was negotiated between the
heirs of Eberhardt Hantsch and WBI, Todd
and Insurance Company of North America
(hereafter INA), one of WBFs insurance
companies. A personal representative was
appointed for Eberhardt's estate to accept
the wrongful death settlement. The superior court ordered payment to the estate on
November 4, 1975. The heirs of Eberhardt's estate subsequently released WBI,
Todd, and INA from any and all claims
arising from the September 4, 1974, accident. However, WBI, Todd and INA did
not release the estate from liability. The
estate was closed in 1979.
On October 20, 1975, a wrongful death
action was filed against WBI on behalf of
the estates of Marna Jill Hantsch and Jonathan Hantsch. WBI filed an answer in
November 1975 in which it asserted, inter
alia, that the negligence of Eberhardt
caused the accident. Later, in 1978, WBI
moved to amend the answer to assert a

third-party claim sounding in contribution
against the estate of Eberhardt. This motion was denied. The case went to trial in
1979 and a jury verdict was returned for
the estates of Marna Jill and Jonathan.
WBI appealed the verdict, but settled the
matter for $575,000 while the appeal was
pending.
WBI filed a claim for contribution
against the estate of Eberhardt Hantsch on
October 27, 1980. Patricia Chappel was
appointed as special administrator for the
estate on November 5. A complaint for
contribution already had been filed against
her on October 10, prior to her appointment.
Chappel notified ICBC of the contribution action on November 11, 1980. This
was the first notice to ICBC of the automobile accident of September 4, 1974. On
November 28, 1982, Chappel moved for a
summary judgment stating that "the only
source for relief herein is from an insurance policy which does not provide coverage." There was no policy coverage since
the notice was untimely and the delay was
unreasonable, unjustifiable and prejudicial.
The superior court granted the summary
judgment on February 23, 1983, and this
appeal followed.
There are three questions before us in
this appeal: 1) Does untimely notice per se
relieve the insurer from any obligation under the insurance policy? 2) If not, who
has the burden of demonstrating prejudice
to the insurer as a result of the delay? 3)
Has sufficient prejudice been demonstrated
in this case so that summary judgment was
proper?
II. EFFECT OF UNTIMELY NOTICE
ICBC was first notified of the automobile
accident over six years after the date of the
accident. Eberhardt Hantsch's insurance
policy provided the following as to notice:
6.24 Each insured shall promptly give
to the corporation written notice, with all
available particulars, of any accident involving loss or damage to persons or
property in which he, or any motor-vehi-
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cle owned or driven by him, has been
involved, and of any claim made on account of any such accident; . . .
The policy also stated that a breach of any
condition entitles the insurance company to
refuse to pay any indemnity. There is no
question as to the lateness of the notice in
this case but we must decide whether the
delay per se relieves the insurance company from payment under the policy.
[1] We note first that interpretation of
insurance provisions is not controlled directly by usual contractual principles. Insurance policies may be considered contracts of adhesion due to the inequality in
bargaining power. In Stordahl v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 564 P.2d
63, 66 (Alaska 1977), we stated that an
insurance provision "should be construed
to provide the coverage which a layperson
would have reasonably expected, given a
lay interpretation of the policy language."
(Footnote omitted). See also Guin v. Ha,
591 P.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Alaska 1979).
Traditionally, courts have construed
prompt notice provisions as conditions
precedent to liability under an insurance
policy. 2 R.H. Long, Law of Liability Insurance, § 13.03 (1982). The insurer is not
liable until the notice requirement is met.
If prompt notice is not given then liability
under the policy has not matured. This
strict contractual approach has often been
tempered by allowing exceptions where the
insured's delay is excused. Sanderson v.
Postal Life Insurance Co., 87 F.2d 58
(10th Cir.1936) (16-year delay excused due
to party's ignorance as to existence of coverage); Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Wells, 453 F.Supp. 808 (N.D.Ala.1978)
(lVz-year delay excused when plaintiff did
not know that father's automobile insurance covered son's motorcycle accident);
Suire v. Combined Insurance Co. of
America, 290 So.2d 271 (La. 1974); Thomp1. See Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66,
371 A.2d 193, 198 n. 8 (1977).
2. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 360 F.Supp.
139, 141 (D.Colo. 1973); Artukovich v. St. PaulMercury Indemnity Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 312, 310

son v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422 (1972).
[2] The modern trend rejects the above
approach and considers prejudice to the
insurer as the material factor. Brakeman
v. Potomac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371
A.2d 193 (1977); Pulse v. Northwest Farm
Bureau Insurance Co., 18 Wash.App. 59,
566 P.2d 577 (1977). This trend is consistent with the purpose behind prompt notice
provisions. The purpose has been well
summarized in 8 J. Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice § 4731, at 2-5 (Rev. ed.
1981):
The purpose of a policy provision requiring the insured to give the company
prompt notice of an accident or claim is
to give the insurer an opportunity to
make a timely and adequate investigation of all the circumstances
And
further, if the insurer is thus given the
opportunity for a timely investigation,
reasonable compromises and settlements
may be made, thereby avoiding prolonged and unnecessary litigation.
[Footnote omitted].
In short, the notice requirement is designed
to protect the insurer from prejudice. In
the absence of prejudice, regardless of the
reasons for the delayed notice, there is no
justification for excusing the insurer from
its obligations under the policy. We recognize the strong societal interest in preserving insurance coverage for accident victims
so long as the preservation is equitable for
all parties involved.1
III. BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING
PREJUDICE
[3] Jurisdictions which have treated
prejudice as the material factor still disagree as to who has the burden of proving
existence or lack of prejudice. Some jurisdictions require the insured to prove that
the untimely notice did not prejudice the
company2 while others place the burden of
P.2d 461, 469 (1957) (untimely notice raises
presumption of prejudice and insured has burden of rebutting); Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 222 So.2d 206, 209 (Fla.1969); Calhoun v.
Western Casualty & Surety Co., 260 Wis. 34, 49
N.W.2d 911, 912 (1951).

126

Alaska

684 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

demonstrating prejudice on the insurer.3
We conclude the burden should be on the
insurer. Information regarding prejudice
is generally more readily available to the
insurer than the insured. The insurer is in
a better position to demonstrate that its
ability to investigate, defend or settle a
claim has been impaired.
We hold that in a case of untimely notice
to an insurer, the insurer must prove that
it has actually been prejudiced by the delay
before its liability is extinguished.
IV. PREJUDICE TO ICBC
[4,5] Generally proof of prejudice to
the insurer is a question of fact. Pulse v.
Northwest Farm Bureau Insurance Co.,
18 Wash.App. 59, 566 P 2d 577, 579 (1977).
A summary judgment may only be granted
if the proponent of the motion shows that
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and also that he is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Wickwire v. McFadden,
576 P.2d 986, 987 (Alaska 1978); Whaley v.
State, 438 P.2d 718, 719 (Alaska 1968).
The estate and ICBC argue that the summary judgment motion was properly granted since they proffered undisputed evidence of prejudice. Since WBI did not
respond to the allegations of prejudice,
ICBC claims that Alaska Civil Rule 56(e)
supports the granting of the motion.4
ICBC claims that it was prejudiced in
three ways: 1) opportunities to investigate
have been lost; 2) opportunities to negotiate and settle have been lost; and 3) oppor3. LaPlace v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd, 298 FSupp
764, 767 (DV.I.1969), Lindus v. Northern Ins.
Co, 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P 2d 311, 315 (1968),
Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d at 198,
Pulse v. Northwest Farm Bureau Ins Co., 18
Wash.App. 59, 566 P 2d 577, 579 (1977).
4. Alaska Civil Rule 56(e) reads in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.

tunities to defend have been lost. Had
ICBC met its initial burden of showing that
there was no genuine issue of material
fact, WBFs failure to respond with affidavits or other evidence would justify the
summary judgment. However, ICBC did
no more than to allege prejudice. It introduced no evidence in support of its claims.5
For instance there was no evidence that
ICBC customarily investigated or settled
similar claims.6 This case is very similar to
that before the Washington court in Oregon Automobile
Insurance
Co. v.
Salzberg, 85 Wash.2d 372, 535 P.2d 816
(1975). There, the court concluded that the
summary judgment should not have been
granted, since the "respondent alleged that
it incurred prejudice by Salzberg's actions,
but there is nothing in the record supportive of this contention." Id. at 819.7
[6] Since ICBC did not meet its initial
burden of showing that there were no genuine issues of material fact the summary
judgment motion should have been denied
regardless of whether WBI failed to respond to the motion with affidavits or other
evidence. See Jacobsen v. State, 89
Wash.2d 104, 569 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1977).
The judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED.

5. See Ratchff v. Security Natl Bank, 670 P 2d
1139, 1142 (Alaska 1983) (To discharge burden
of showing no material issues of fact, movant
must submit admissible evidence in support of
its version of the facts).
6. Indeed, ICBC's examiner—a person responsible for any claims of excess of $25,000 originating out of the Province of British Columbia—was instructed by ICBC counsel not to answer any questions regarding handling claims
arising in the United States.
7. WBI also sought to obtain from ICBC the
outside date ICBC would have considered notice
in compliance with the policy. ICBC declined
to respond on the ground that it was not a party
to the lawsuit.

